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INTRODUCTION
It is easy to get lost. Law students enrolled in introductory antitrust courses know
this well. Apparently, so does the judiciary. A broad “charter of freedom”1—the
“Magna Carta of free enterprise”2—the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade,” and condemns “every person
who shall monopolize” any commercial market.3 In that single legislative stroke
more than a century ago, Congress both attended to public outcry over ravaging
cartels and sent the judiciary on an expedition into the “wilds of economic theory.”4
There is little doubt that Congress intended economic regulation under the
Sherman Act to develop with flexibility—case-by-case, claim-by-claim.5 Yet, given

*. J.D., 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2016, Indiana University
- Indianapolis. Foremost thanks to my wife, Mariana Lopez-Owens, for her patient and
unending support. Very special thanks also to Professor Shana Wallace for helpful feedback
and invaluable mentorship. Finally, gratitude to Professor Dawn Johnsen and the hardworking
staff of the Indiana Law Journal.
1. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
2. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as
Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885, 886 (2012) (“The Sherman Act of 1890 is the
foundational statute of federal antitrust law.”).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
4. Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.10; see Leslie, supra note 2, at 888.
5. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007)
(“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”); see
also 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 301, at 5–7, (4th ed.
2014); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common
Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 661–63 (1982) (arguing that to afford
flexibility, “Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a
common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general
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the unusual level of interpretation the Act requires, the effort of supplying the content
of it’s sweeping prohibitions often bears closer resemblance to formulating policy
than to deciphering text.6 The result, in the words of Richard Posner, is that the
judiciary has “made antitrust law out of the cryptic antiquated language of the
Sherman Act.”7
Perhaps more than ever, the vagueness of the Sherman Act’s text needs a remedy
that a century’s worth of judicial gloss has failed to provide. Reliance on the
customary techniques of judicial reasoning may now make less sense;8 the
modernization of our economy demands a modernized antitrust regime.9 Decided
upon more than one hundred years ago, the primarily post-hoc, increasingly factintensive adjudicative approach sent the judiciary roving through the complexities of
competition economics with far less than a statutory Polaris.10 And after a centuryplus long foray into the complexities of economic competition, it is even possible
that the judiciary has plunged into the “sea of unconstitutionality.”11

statutory directions”).
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 104
(2016).
7. Id. at 107 (emphasis added). Of course, the Sherman Act has been supplemented by
other statutes—notably, “the equally cryptic Clayton Act.” Id.; see also AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 301, at 6–7. “[T]he use of unelaborated common law words and
references seems simply to have invested the federal courts with a new jurisdiction.” AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 301, at 6. On one hand, “the Sherman Act . . . could be taken
as a legislative indication of the proper direction.” On the other hand, the Act “may be seen
not as a prohibition of any specific conduct but as a general authority to do what common law
courts usually do.” Id. ¶ 301, at 6–7.
8. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 306, at 81 (observing that “judges may
sometimes be quite far at sea” with such economic concepts as “anticompetitive harm,
procompetitive redeeming virtues, and less restrictive alternatives”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 36 (The Free Press 1993) (1978)
(arguing that the Sherman Act’s evolution is “controlled by the progress of economic
understanding”); Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160
(2008) [hereinafter Crane, Technocracy] (arguing that antitrust’s technocratic shift should
continue).
9. See generally Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs
a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2011); see also BORK, supra note 8, at 81. In Bork’s
estimation, “the problem that arises when antitrust adjudication attempts to reconcile
inconsistent values on a case-by-case basis should be enough to indicate the impropriety of
courts undertaking such a function.” BORK, supra note 8, at 81.
10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST 34 (2017) (“[T]he Sherman Act
condemns ‘every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade,’ or every person
who shall ‘monopolize,’ without giving a clue about what those phrases mean.”); Robert H.
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 48 (1966) (“In
terms of ‘law’ . . . the Sherman Act tells judges very little.”).
11. Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman’s March (In)to the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REV. 319, 325
(2007). Judge Oldham contends that the modern-day scope of the Sherman Act has entered
the realm of unconstitutionality in part because the judiciary has misguidedly interpreted the
Act such that “judges can and should create substantive rules without legislative guidance.”
Id. In Judge Oldham’s view, this interpretation has “unmoored the Sherman Act from its
statutory foundations.” Id.; see also infra Part III.
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Of course, the fact that the Supreme Court retains ultimate interpretive authority
does not make the judiciary a lone adventurer.12 Enforcement agencies must also
navigate the economic landscape to give content to the Act’s prohibitions.13 Not only
does the text of the Act grant the judiciary largely unfettered interpretive leeway, it
also affords enforcers unsettling discretion to determine whether conduct deserves
criminal penalties14 or civil remedies.15 But given that the judiciary is generally
comprised of high-level generalists rather than technology-forward economic
experts, the judiciary may no longer be best equipped to play the leading role.16 The
judiciary is certainly apt to reason by way of analogy and precedent, but
interpretation of the Sherman Act requires that adjudicators and norm-creators
maintain an updated comprehension of prevailing economic theory and modern
business practices.17 Faced with emergent technologies and business models that

12. See Oldham, supra note 11, at 320.
13. See BORK, supra note 8, at 36 (“Precedent is not ultimately controlling; economic
argument is.”). The DOJ and the FTC offer economic arguments in a myriad of Sherman Actrelated litigation. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD
STATISTICS FY 2008–2017, https://www.justice.gv/atr/fi;e/788426/download [https://perma
.cc/R4TC-TDXG]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, Anticompetitive Practices, https://www.ftc.gov
/enforcement/anticompetitive-practices [https://perma.cc/WKS9-V4KN].
14. The Act’s significantly enhanced criminal penalties loom over imprudent corporate
executives. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). A violation committed by a corporation is punishable
by up to a $100,000,000 fine. Id. Individuals can be fined $1,000,000, imprisoned up to 10
years, or both. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS YIELDING A
CORPORATE FINE OF $10 MILLION OR MORE (last updated June 13, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/sherman-act-violations-yielding-corporate-fine-10-million-or-more
[https://perma.cc/8KFW-B2FY].
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL:
CRIMINAL
DIVISION,
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions
-manual-criminal-division [https://perma.cc/DW8Z-RQWU] (last updated Aug. 31, 2018); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (2016) [hereinafter NO-POACH GUIDANCE];
Karen L. Corman, Karen Hoffman Lent & Tara L. Reinhart, Shifting Enforcement of NoPoaching Agreements, SKADDEN (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights
/publications/2018/04/quarterly-insights/shifting-enforcement-of-nopoaching-agreements.
16. See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals,
54 J. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2011); Haw, supra note 9, at 1248; C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (2009) (“Unfortunately, courts lack the information needed to select
optimal rules . . . . In selecting an antitrust decisionmaker, moreover, we ought to favor the
institution that has superior access to aggregate information . . . .”); see also Alex Lipton,
Supreme Court Justices Just Don’t Understand Tech, SHAKE (June 25, 2014), http://www
.shakelaw.com/blog/supreme-court-judges-tech/ [https://perma.cc/NZG8-RPVW]; Casey C.
Sullivan, Judges Know Nothing About Technology, Judge Says, FINDLAW: TECHNOLOGIST
(July 31, 2015, 10:58 AM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2015/07/judges-know
-nothing-about-technology-judge-says.html [https://perma.cc/QDB5-4HFA].
17. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1248; Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in
Antitrust, 158 U. PENN L. REV. 261, 286 (“Judges do not necessarily understand how
businesses operate, and most judges are unfamiliar with the full sweep of the relevant
economics literature . . . .”).
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lend themselves to increased market concentration,18 the regulatory task increasingly
demands enlightened, data-driven analysis.19 And against the judiciary’s lack of
economic expertise, the input of expert witnesses and third-party industry
stakeholders have come to play an important role in the adjudication of Sherman Act
cases.20
Yet, even as ideas that were once indubitable have become the subjects of open
debate,21 none of this is to say that the Act should be tossed out entirely. An updated
enforcement approach need not completely abandon traditional principles.22 Shifts
in the regulatory landscape over the past several decades are likely indications that
the wilds have been tamed in significant ways.23 Still, the combination of a
widespread decline in competition,24 disagreement over fundamental antitrust

18. See Lina M. Khan, Sources of Tech Platform Power, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 325, 325
(2018) [hereinafter Platform Power] (“A handful of tech platforms mediate a large and
growing share of our commerce and communications.”); see also COUNCIL OF ECON.
ADVISORS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER (2016); Paula
Dwyer, Should America’s Tech Giants Be Broken Up?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 20,
2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-20/should-america-s
-tech-giants-be-broken-up; Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant
-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing [https://perma.cc/998Y-PULR].
19. Haw, supra note 9, at 1248.
20. Id. at 1248, 1287; see also Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust
Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 50 (2007) [hereinafter Crane, Rules Versus
Standards] (“Once the stars of the antitrust courtroom, lawyers now play the supporting cast
to economists.”); Jesse Eisinger & Justin Elliot, These Professors Make More Than a
Thousand Bucks an Hour Peddling Mega-Mergers, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/these-professors-make-more-than-thousand-bucks-hour
-peddling-mega-mergers [https://perma.cc/F6PS-DH6N] (“Today, lawyers still write the
briefs, make the arguments and conduct the trials, but the core arguments are over economists’
models . . . .”). In fact, the DOJ and FTC even participate as amici in litigation between private
parties. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S.
Ct. 2647 (cert. granted June 18, 2018) (No. 17-204), 2018 WL 2131602.
21. David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-antitrust
-lina-khan-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/B423-JK4V].
22. See, e.g., SENATE DEMOCRATS, A BETTER DEAL: CRACKING DOWN ON CORPORATE
MONOPOLIES (2017), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017/07/A-Better
-Deal-on-Competition-and-Costs-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7AM-DELU]; Hearings on
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection
[https://perma.cc
/WKF3-LFWC].
23. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 50 (“The wilds are being tamed.”).
24. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem,
127 YALE L.J. F. 960, 960–61 (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-ideological
-roots-of-americas-market-power-problem [https://perma.cc/4PZ9-G9KM].
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philosophies,25 and swells of public and political fervor26 demands that Congress do
what it did in 1890: update antitrust’s policy-making approach.27 An additional step
toward taming the wilds—toward optimizing clarity, predictability, and outcomes
—might be to shift the task of interpreting the Sherman Act to an antitrust agency.28
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines the interpretive difficulties
spawned by the vagueness of the Sherman Act—particularly, the judiciary’s
necessary but undeniable departures from the text of the statute and the resulting
doctrinal confusion. Part II considers ways in which the judiciary’s decision-making
in Sherman Act cases approximates agency rulemaking and whether it makes sense
to delegate interpretive authority to an antitrust agency. Yet, while the agency
solution has upside, it would not easily escape criticisms that the Act does not provide
sufficient notice of the conduct it proscribes and that the Act is an impermissible
delegation of legislative authority.29 Part III examines these two hurdles, taking stock
of separation of powers and void-for-vagueness principles. Part IV concludes.
I. DOCTRINAL CLARITY—OR NOT
It has always been true that Sherman Act cases are too complex for the judiciary
to resolve with strict adherence to a literal reading of the text.30 Because the text itself
provides little direction, the judiciary has spent more than a century smoothing a
“judicial gloss” over the Sherman Act’s Constitution-like language.31 When the
judiciary updates Sherman Act common law with new insights, it acts, therefore,
much like a legislative body.32 Having spent years attempting to craft bright-line

25. Id. at 964 (“The enfeebled state of antitrust enforcement traces directly to an
intellectual movement that fundamentally rewrote antitrust law—redefining its purpose, its
orientation, and the values that underlie it.”).
26. Id. at 962, 963; see also Alexei Alexis, ‘Hipster Antitrust’ Comes Under Senate
Spotlight, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/hipster-antitrust-comes
-n73014473208 [https://perma.cc/9KAP-U7F9].
27. See generally Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017);
see also Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, Hearing #1 on Competition and
Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system
/files/documents/public_statements/1408196/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9MQ-83QB].
28. See, e.g., Haw, supra note 9, at 1249 (proposing a delegation of interpretive authority
to the FTC); see also Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, supra note 27.
29. See Oldham, supra note 11, at 324; see also Emilie F. Athanasoulis, Note, Is the
Sherman Act Unconstitutionally Vague as a Criminal Statute? A Re-evaluation After Gypsum,
13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1284, 1289 (1979).
30. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 51 (“[A]ntitrust cases are too
complex and socially important to turn on simplistic legal commands.”)
31. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Appalachian
Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE
SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 47 (1910) (“The Sherman Law . . . was
like the Constitution . . . in that it was expressed in brief, broad and comprehensive language,
requiring some judicial construction and many diversified applications to different cases for
its practical development into generally recognized law.”); see also BORK, supra note 8, at 36
(“[T]he Sherman Act [is] not a set of specific rules, still less a body of precedent . . . .”).
32. See Baxter, supra note 5, at 672; Oldham, supra note 11, at 324.
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rules and standards, courts are fully aware that without such guideposts
“businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case
what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act.”33 But brightline rules have not proven to be the most effective tools.34 This Part highlights some
of the doctrinal and interpretive difficulties spawned by the Act’s sparse guidance.
A. Departures from the Text
Generally speaking, Sherman Act section 1 doctrine has been defined by two
purportedly distinct rules: the per se rule and the rule of reason.35 Conduct such as
naked price fixing, market allocation, and group boycotting is considered
irredeemably anticompetive.36 That is, the judiciary has decided that such conduct so
consistently restrains trade that it violates section 1 regardless of circumstance.37 To
successfully prove that a defendant committed a per se violation, plaintiffs
theoretically need only show that the conduct occurred.38 On the other hand, some
conduct could be considered beneficial to competition in light of extant market
conditions and other surrounding circumstances. Under the rule of reason, plaintiffs
must show that the conduct had an anticompetitive effect and that such effects
outweigh any of the conduct’s procompetitive benefits.39 These two rules illustrate
the judiciary’s basic interpretation of the Sherman Act: the Act only prohibits
unreasonable conduct that harms competition more than it promotes competition.40
Whereas per se illegal conduct is characterized by its inherently unreasonable
character, the rule of reason allows defendants to cast their behavior in the best
possible light.41
The judiciary’s reliance on measures of reasonableness represents its first major
departure from the text of the statute. To reiterate, the Sherman Act prohibits “every

33. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
34. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 55 (“[Antitrust law] governs too
vast and too complex an array of business practices to be reduced to a handful of categorical
rules.”); Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman Act and Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness, 45 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 709, 761 (2018) (arguing that the “deficiencies of the [Sherman Act’s] text” have
resulted in “judicially-created rules that tolerate and maintain ambiguity”); Maurice E. Stucke,
Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1378 (2009).
35. Stucke, supra note 34, at 1378 (“In determining the legality of restraints of trade, the
Supreme Court generally employs either a per se or rule-of-reason standard.”); see also
Oldham, supra note 11, at 320.
36. See Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and
What to Look For, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/price-fixing-bid
-rigging-and-market-allocation-schemes [https://perma.cc/C3HH-U3RR] (last updated June
25, 2015).
37. HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 233 (“The per se rule says that once we know a certain
amount about a practice we can pass judgment on its legality without further inquiry.”); see
also, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (summarizing the per se rule).
38. E.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 233.
39. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S 231, 238 (1918) (summarizing
the rule of reason); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305, at 62–63.
40. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305, at 62–63.
41. Id.
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. . . combination . . . in restraint of trade.”42 The plain reading of that language was
rejected early on when the judiciary reasoned instead that not every conceivable
contract or combination is prohibited by the Act—only those that unreasonably
restrain trade are prohibited.43 From the standpoint of logic and policy, this
interpretation is undoubtedly desirable.44 Indeed, the function of all contracts is to
restrain trade, and every market requires some degree of cooperation among those
who might otherwise be competitors.45 This interpretation is not, however, grounded
in a strictly plain reading of the text.
Another major departure from the statute’s text occurred later on with the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.46 Keep in
mind: in terms of criminal liability the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”47 The Gypsum defendants
faced criminal sanctions under this provision for engaging in a per se illegal pricefixing scheme.48 The Court admitted that “[t]he Sherman Act, unlike most traditional
criminal statutes, does not . . . precisely identify the conduct which it proscribes[,]”
creating the possibility that even acts committed without criminal intent could lead
to criminal liability.49 Then, without any textual reference to state of mind or intent,
the Court held that criminal liability cannot be rendered under the Sherman Act
unless the defendant possesses “knowledge of [the] probable consequences” of her
conduct.50 Unlike other federal criminal statutes, the Sherman Act’s mens rea
requirement is the product not of careful legislation, but of unavoidable judicial
reasoning.51

42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added).
43. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
62–65 (1911); Robert Connolly, The Sherman Act is Unconstitutional as a Criminal Statute:
(Part 1), CARTEL CAPERS (July 6, 2017), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/sherman-act
-unconstitutional-criminal-statute-part-1/#_ftnref [https://perma.cc/C7XH-PMUG] (“[T]he
first Supreme Court triage on the Sherman Act was that only ‘unreasonable restraints’ of trade
were prohibited. But, that doesn’t clear things up too much—What is an unreasonable restraint
of trade?” (footnote omitted)); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)
(“Although [the Sherman Act’s] prohibition is literally all-encompassing, the courts have
construed it as precluding only those contracts or combinations which ‘unreasonably’ restrain
competition.” (citations omitted)); Baxter, supra note 5, at 668.
44. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(explaining that if “read literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of private contract law,”
which is a body of law that “enables competitive markets . . . to function effectively”).
45. Id. (“One problem presented by the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is that it
cannot mean what it says. The statute says that ‘every’ contract that restrains trade is unlawful.
But . . . restraint is the very essence of every contract.”); Leslie supra note 2, at 890 (“[T]he
text of Section 1 risks invalidating all contracts because every contract restrains trade in some
way.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1, 3 (1984).
46. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
48. See Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 444. Prescribing such a prohibition on criminal intent is typically considered the
job of the legislature. See infra Part III.
51. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 32–2721 (codifying federal crimes).
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B. “Bright-Line” Rules
Again, the Court’s departures from the text of the statute can be characterized as
practical responses to the difficulties of impracticable language. Commerce would
surely be stifled if every contract in restraint of trade were made illegal, and much
procompetitive conduct might be discouraged if even well-intentioned behavior
triggered criminal sanctions.52 But while the initial major departure involved what
was an apparently clean distinction between two categories of conduct, the
dichotomous per se versus rule of reason schema has gradually become less than
clear.53
The shift away from clean categories has most likely been impelled by the
increased difficulty and complexity of Sherman Act cases.54 Indeed, the Court has
admitted that “our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than
terms like ‘per se’ . . . and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.”55 Nor does
the Court deny that “there is often no bright line separating per se from [r]ule of
[r]eason analysis.”56 In the Court’s estimation, “[p]er se rules may require
considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a
presumption of anticompetitive conduct.”57 And as the economy continues to
modernize, the judiciary considers fewer and fewer behaviors appropriate for
analysis under the per se rule.58
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, for example, the Court held
that minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) was a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.59 Several decades later, exposed to new economic theories, the Court changed
its mind about RPM. It held in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.

52. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 303, at 44. But see Nash v. United States,
229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (upholding the constitutionality of the Sherman Act’s vague text in
light of defendant’s argument that “estimates may differ” as to the Act’s meaning, and that,
therefore, “a man might find himself in prison because his honest judgment did not anticipate
that of a jury of less competent men”).
53. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 58, 67.
54. See id. at 55 (“Antitrust law . . . governs too vast and complex an array business
practices to be reduced to a handful of categorical rules.”); Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 5
(“The practices that come before the courts today are more complex . . . and the questions are
more difficult.”).
55. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
56. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984)
(emphasis omitted).
57. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104, n.26.
58. See Abbot B. Lipsky, Antitrust Economics—Making Progress, Avoiding Regression,
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 163 (2003) (observing that “the upsurge of antitrust economics has
gone hand-in-hand with the abandonment of most per se rules”); Crane, Rules Versus
Standards, supra note 20, at 84 (describing “the growing inclination toward fulsome review
of the facts” and the growing inclination of courts to “reject bright-line rules”); Easterbrook,
supra note 45, at 7.
59. 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911). The term “resale price maintenance” describes an
agreement between a supplier and a retailer in which the retailer agrees not to discount a
product’s retail price below the level set by the supplier.
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that RPM may carry procompetitive benefits in some situations and should therefore
be analyzed under the rule of reason, rather than under the per se rule.60
In addition to RPM, the list of conduct once considered appropriate for strict per
se analysis—but no longer considered as such—includes maximum price
maintenance,61 non-price vertical restraints,62 and even some forms of horizontal
restraints. For instance, while tying has traditionally been considered per se illegal,
it is typically analyzed under a rule that is “per se” in name only.63 In Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., the court declined to apply per se analysis to a blanket
licensing arrangement that facilitated a fix on prices.64 In NCAA v. Board of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma, the Court declined to apply the per se rule to the
NCAA’s limitation on televising college football games, even though the limitation
fixed price and restricted output.65 The thing to take away from these cases is that
although price fixing and other quintessential per se violations were once considered
unquestionably anticompetitive, quintessentially anticompetitive behavior may be
permitted if it is found to be economically efficient or beneficial.66
But it’s not just the deterioration of the per se rule that fosters confusion. Even the
rule of reason does not provide significant clarity or predictability. In Ohio v.
American Express Co., the Court followed an unprecedented application of the rule
of reason by inserting the concept of two-sided markets.67 The Court held that where
a firm, such as a credit card company, serves different sets of customers in distinct
but interrelated sides of a market, such as cardholders and merchants, plaintiffs must
show that the defendant’s conduct had anticompetitive effects in both sides of the
market.68 But prior to the Court’s ruling in American Express, it had been generally
understood that markets should be defined narrowly. The Court had explained in
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States that even if a firm serves two sides
of a market, the analysis should be carefully focused on the side of the market that

60. 551 U.S. 877, 894 (2007).
61. Compare Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), with State Oil v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3 (1997).
62. Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), with
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
63. HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 406–08 (explaining that “the so-called per se rule
applied to tying arrangements is idiosyncratic” because it requires “proof of market power”
and allows defendants to “offer various defenses”). Compare United States v. N. Pac. Ry. Co.,
356 U.S. 1 (1958) (declaring that tying is appropriate for per se analysis), with Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (declining to apply per se analysis to a hospital’s tiein of anesthesiological services). See also, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001 (applying rule of reason analysis to a tie-in executed as a bundled discount).
64. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23, 24 (1979) (“[W]e have some
doubt—enough to counsel against application of the per se rule—about the extent to which
[issuance of blanket licenses] threatens . . . competitive pricing . . . . we cannot agree that it
should automatically be declared illegal . . . .”).
65. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
66. See, e.g., id.
67. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). Cf. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953) (examining the market for newspaper readers independently from the interrelated
market for newspaper advertising space).
68. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2286–88.
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was harmed by the anticompetitive conduct.69 This is exactly what the Court declined
to do in American Express, even though nearly all markets can be understood as twosided.70 The Court’s adoption of a two-sided market theory is a slippery slope that
may allow firms to demonstrate the reasonableness of their anticompetitive conduct
if they can show that it only harmed one side of a two-sided market.71
Beyond the doctrinal confusion it causes, confusion over the rules’ inner and outer
contours has been experienced by firms in the form of increased litigation costs.72
The value of the per se rule is attributable in part to the prelitigation cost savings
generated by its simplicity: less to prove means less discovery, which limits parties’
expenses and conserves judicial resources.73 Indeed, as the Court has observed, the
per se rule “avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged
economic investigation into the entire history of the industr[ies] involved” just to
figure out whether particular conduct caused unreasonable harm to competition.74
But when everything is relevant, as it is under the rule of reason, the disposition of
most cases is far from simple.75 Doctrinal ambiguity and new conceptions of
economic theory necessitate that courts wait until after discovery to determine
whether the per se rule or the rule of reason should apply.76 Even if a per se violation
is alleged, parties cannot be sure whether a court will decide that per se analysis is
appropriate until voluminous documents are assessed, several experts are consulted,
and many facts are developed.77 Thus, parties may end up litigating through
discovery and absorbing the costs of rule of reason litigation nonetheless.78 If only
post-discovery rule determinations are possible, the per se rule forfeits the value of
its cost-reducing function.79

69. See id. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 594 (1953).
70. See Lina M. Khan, The Supreme Court Case That Could Give Tech Giants More
Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/the
-supreme-court-case-that-could-give-tech-giants-more-power.html [https://perma.cc/W2P9
-H2NP]. For example, Amazon provides a platform that connects buyers and sellers of goods;
Facebook and Google connect users and advertisers; Uber and Lyft facilitate a market between
riders and drivers; Apple links app makers with app users; Spotify and Pandora connect
musicians and listeners; banks provide platforms for depositors and borrowers; and airports
facilitate trade between airlines and travelers. Id.; see also Khan, supra note 18, at 325 (2018)
(describing various forms of power possessed by firms that provide two-sided platforms).
71. See Khan, supra note 18. For instance, if Uber instituted an exclusivity agreement
prohibiting its drivers from also driving for Lyft, Uber drivers would be anticompetitively
harmed. But Uber might be able to escape antitrust scrutiny if it could demonstrate that the
other side of the market—riders—were not harmed by the exclusivity agreement. Id.
72. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 311, at 241; see also Crane, Rules Versus
Standards, supra note 20, at 83 (“Per se rules of illegality are often vastly overbroad but an
open-ended rule of reason approach would create excessive litigation costs and uncertainty.”).
73. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305, at 68–70.
74. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
75. See Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 9 (“When everything is relevant, nothing is
dispositive.”).
76. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 311, at 241; see also Easterbrook, supra note
45, at 7 (“We canot condemn so quickly anymore. What we do not condemn, we must study.
The approved method of study is the Rule of Reason.”).
77. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 311, at 241–42.
78. Id.
79. Id. The Court attempted its own solution to this litigation expense problem by
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Given the dynamism of the interpretive approach Congress prescribed the
Sherman Act, a relative lack of clarity and predictability is probably par for the
course.80 It has been argued, furthermore, that given Sherman Act interpreters’
arduous task of applying murky doctrine to highly nuanced facts, a degree of
confusion must be tolerated.81 But requests for tolerance downplay the judiciary’s
limited ability to resolve complex economic issues by way of open-ended
examinations into the costs and benefits of any particular course of conduct.82 The
judiciary seems, as a result, to have embraced the invitation to “ramble through the
wilds.”83 Clean analytical categories have largely taken a backseat to a post-hoc, factintensive balancing approach.84 As a result, the doctrine has become cluttered with
“diverse and even contradictory strains,”85 “decisions that now seem blunders,”86 and
“substantial doctrinal confusion, if not plain error.”87
The judiciary’s failure to appreciate the economics of restraints on trade and the
methods by which colluders succeed creates a breeding ground for confusion.88 The
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the judiciary is “ill-equppied and illsuited” to “analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the
endless data that [is] brought to bear on such decisions.”89 The reality is that in light
of the alarming level of power held by firms wielding new technologies and new

integrating a threshold “triaging” tool, which has asserted its own impact on the deterioration
of the dichotomous structure of section 1. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20,
at 61. This preliminary inquiry, often referred to as the “quick look” rule, involves a truncated
analysis which is more elaborate than per se examination, but not quite a full-fledged rule of
reason analysis. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (observing that the
basis for “abbreviated or ‘quick look’ analysis” was formed by the collection of FTC v. Ind.
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85 (1984); and Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)). Needless
to say, it is not entirely clear which cases are appropriate for a quick look analysis; plus, even
after the quick look, parties may end up litigating under the rule of reason anyway. AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305, at 73–74.
80. See Baxter, supra note 5, at 671.
81. Id.
82. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916–17
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How easily can courts identify instances in which the benefits
are likely to outweigh potential harms? . . . . [N]ot very easily . . . . One cannot fairly expect
judges and juries in such cases to apply complex economic criteria without making a
considerable number of mistakes . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); see also Easterbrook, supra note
45, at 9 (“[J]udges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require.”).
83. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
84. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 51, 58 (describing “the growing
inclination toward fulsome review of the facts” and the growing inclination of courts to “reject
bright-line rules”).
85. BORK, supra note 8, at 36.
86. Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2.
87. Baxter, supra note 5, at 671.
88. See Bork, supra note 8, at 48 (observing that a judge’s responsibility is that of
“continually creating and recreating the Sherman Act out of his understanding of economics”);
Leslie, supra note 2, at 893, 894. See generally Baye & Wright, supra note 16.
89. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611–12 (1972).
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business models,90 the economic analysis required for deciding Sherman Act cases
demands more technological and data-driven economic expertise than it once did.91
II. SHOULD WE CALL IN THE EXPERTS?
Our increasingly modernized economy demands that our regulatory approach be
updated in stride.92 The gradual influx of microeconomics and post-hoc examination
of facts has steadily increased the role economists and industry experts play in
antitrust.93 Yet, economic theories and microeconomic analyses are not always easily
articulated to the judiciary.94 More can be done to make Sherman Act regulation a
formally expert-driven administrative enterprise rather than a generalist-driven
adjudicative one.95 A more optimal level of clarity and predictability might be
achieved by integrating some level of antitrust agency rulemaking.96 This Part briefly
considers the idea that an agency rulemaking solution makes the most sense given
that Sherman Act interpreters (the judiciary) and enforcers (the FTC and the DOJ)
already approximate agency rulemaking to some degree.
A. Approximating Agency Rulemaking
First, like agencies during notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Court relies on
external sources of analytical and empirical information to parse through difficult
theoretical arguments.97 Because the judiciary is comprised mostly of generalist
judges, it must somehow make up for its lack of access to powerful empirical and
analytical tools.98 The Court cannot simply rely on litigants to do all the heavy
analytical lifting; litigants advocate their economic analyses in ways that favor the

90. See Khan, supra note 18, at 325.
91. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1263.
92. See generally Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, supra note 27
(outlining the need for an updated antitrust enforcement approach).
93. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 50. (“As antitrust has become
de-politicized and de-ideologized, flexible technocratic expertise has replaced legalist
conceptualism. Once the stars of the antitrust courtroom, lawyers now play the supporting cast
to economists.”); Lipsky, supra note 58, at 165 (“[R]apid assimilation of microeconomics into
antitrust thinking makes almost every antitrust controversy an exercise in microeconomic
analysis.”).
94. See, e.g., Baye & Wright, supra note 16.
95. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 1160 (celebrating antitrust’s
technocratic shift); Lipsky, supra note 58, at 164 (exploring how antitrust’s economic
revolution can be advanced to the next stage). But see Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller,
Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2544 (2013) (criticizing antitrust’s
technocratic shift as an “unbalanced system [that] puts too much control in the hands of
technical experts, moving antitrust enforcement too far away from its democratic roots”).
96. See generally Haw, supra note 9.
97. Id. at 1248.
98. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 107.
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outcomes they seek.99 Naturally, then, the Court must often rely on third-party
sources of information, such as academic studies and data.100
The Court seems to place significant weight on the perspectives of interested
parties who participate in antitrust cases as an amicus curiae.101 As amici, trade
associations, companies, professors, and others offer their own empirical data and
perspectives.102 Interested parties lobby the Court for a preferred rule much the way
these same parties submit comments to administrative agencies.103 But under the
adjudicative approach, it is difficult to predict how an inexpert court will discriminate
between opposing versions of an economic theory.104
Leegin, which overturned the Court’s century-old ban on RPM, is a good example
of the Court’s agency rulemaking approximation.105 The Leegin Court relied
significantly on amicus briefs signed by more than two dozen economists,106 which
theorized the procompetitive benefits of RPM and offered empirical data
highlighting the costs of applying the per se rule to RPM.107 The Court cited to the
amici’s arguments on multiple occasions,108 demonstrating that the Court placed
some weight on the amici’s perspectives, much as an agency would do during noticeand-comment rulemaking.109 More recently, in American Express, the majority
opinion was littered with citations to secondary sources discussed by amici.110 There,

99. Haw, supra note 9, at 1260.
100. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2295 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that there is no support in antitrust law for treating a two-sided market as a singular
whole).
101. See generally Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625
(2001) (examining the influence of amici in particular cases and noting that “[a]lthough many
important antitrust cases were written without benefit of amici . . . amicus participation has
helped shape the doctrine we apply every day”). See also Crane, Rules Versus Standards,
supra note 20, at 96 (observing that “amicus curiae briefs can exert considerable influence”
and that “[a]ffected constituencies frequently attempt to shape antitrust decisions”); Haw,
supra note 9 at 1248 (arguing that “help with understanding economic theory and interpreting
empirical data on competition . . . comes from amicus briefs” which “often present more
economic arguments than the parties’ briefs” and which “receive considerable attention from
the Court and influence its opinions”).
102. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 96; Haw, supra note 9, at 1248.
103. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1259; see also Calkins, supra note 101, at 652 (“In fact,
amici have long played a key role in addressing the intersection between the per se rule and
the rule of reason.”).
104. See Lipsky, supra note 58, at 175.
105. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). Rebecca
Haw Allensworth also outlines Linkline as a salient example. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1270
(discussing Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns., Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009)). Other
examples outlined by Stephen Calkins include State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); and, among others, Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See Calkins, supra note 101.
106. Haw, supra note 9, at 1280–84.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285–87 (2018); see also Calkins,
supra note 101, at 633 (“[W]hen the Court relies significantly on legal and economics
secondary sources discussed by amici . . . it is at least possible that amici made a difference.”).
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the Court’s reliance on external theories to map out the concept of two-sided markets
was clear. And, as in Leegin, where the Court completely departed from precedent,
the American Express Court departed from earlier precedent instructing that market
analysis should be defined narrowly.111
Like the Court, the DOJ approximates certain aspects of formal rulemaking.
Guidance documents promulgated by the DOJ bear resemblance to rulemakings but
lack the benefits of formal notice and comment.112 Take the DOJ’s no-poach
guidance, for example.113 Published in 2016, the no-poach guidance alerted firms
that agreements between employers to refrain from recruiting each other’s employees
would be subject to criminal sanctions.114 Prior to 2016, no-poach agreements were
only enforced by civil remedies.115 Needless to say, spurred by the possibility of
criminal fines or imprisonment, firms have scrambled to ensure compliance.116 Even
though the no-poach guidance is not a binding policy,117 the DOJ has stuck to its
word and begun pursuing firms that employ no-poaching agreements.118
A major issue with the no-poach guidance is that it announced, almost without
notice, a novel enforcement position and a new risk of criminal liability. Yet,
interested and effected parties were not afforded a formal opportunity to weigh in.119
Of course, whether the Supreme Court will ultimately interpret the Sherman Act such
that no-poach agreements fall within the scope of its criminal prohibitions is
unclear.120 If the Court relies on amicus briefs in determining the criminality of nopoach agreements—briefs which may, for example, parse through theories of
competition in low-skilled labor markets—one result may be heightened uncertainty
among the governed public over the judiciary’s willingness to acquiesce to DOJ
enforcement positions that create new per se violations, as well as new criminally
enforceable per se violations. The broader consequence: an even more blurred line
between the per se rule and the rule of reason.

111. See American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2274; Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 594 (1953).
112. See, e.g., NO-POACH GUIDANCE, supra note 15.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Corman et al., supra note 15.
117. See Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. on the Prohibition on Improper Guidance
Documents (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1012271
/download [https://perma.cc/SY8X-BRFW].
118. See, e.g., James Doubek, 8 Restaurant Chains Agree to End ‘No-Poach’ Agreements
Under Threat of Lawsuit, NPR (Aug. 22, 2018, 3:45 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/22
/640776195/8-fast-food-companies-agree-to-end-no-poach-agreements-under-threat-of
-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/24RT-CTX3]; Victoria Graham, Justice Department to Pursue
Healthcare ‘No-Poach’ Cases, Official Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 27, 2018),
https://www.bna.com/justice-dept-pursue-n73014476113 [https://perma.cc/D4AZ-Y44B].
119. See NO-POACH GUIDANCE, supra note 15.
120. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Knorr and
Wabtec to Terminate Unlawful Agreements Not to Compete for Employees (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-knorr-and-wabtec-terminate
-unlawful-agreements-not-compete [https://perma.cc/WEH6-YBW2] (noting the DOJ’s
decision not to pursue criminal charges against two rail equipment suppliers).
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Clarity and predictability are paramount in a field as impactful and esoteric as
antitrust.121 To be sure, the text of the Sherman Act is so vague and so broad that it
makes sense for the Court to draw on as much information as possible and for the
DOJ to provide at least some clarity by way of guidance documents.122 But if textual
vagueness and judicial inability to perform empirical analyses necessitates reliance
on expert input and guidance documents, it makes more sense to let the experts just
write the rules in the first place.123 Of course, leaving first-instance Sherman Act
interpretation in the hands of the judiciary carries some advantages. Such advantages
include the ability to “create law with actual facts in sight”; to remain “incremental,
adaptive, and flexible”; to “disperse decisionmaking power” horizontally and
vertically; and to avoid “agency-capture problems.”124
However, any such advantages can easily be construed as disadvantages as well.
For example, dispersing decisionmaking power broadly is not significantly
advantageous, if at all, if the decisionmakers lack the requisite expertise. And while
an antitrust agency might be captured by industry interests, the judiciary can also be
captured by intellectual or attitudinal trends.125 For instance, as evidenced by the
contemporary predominance of the consumer welfare standard, as opposed to a total
welfare or competitive process standard, the Court was arguably “captured” by the
Chicago School theories that came to prominence in the 1970s.126
While potential advantages of the adjudicative approach can be debated, the fact
remains that the judiciary is unable to produce expert economic analyses on its own
and must rely on outside input to solve complex economic issues.127 The judiciary is
not optimally positioned to resolve disputes over economic competition.128 An
antitrust agency, on the other hand, could write rules addressing RPM or two-sided
markets or no-poach agreements after conducting its own studies and allowing
interested parties to weigh in during notice and comment. As a result, the benefits of
formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, clarity and predictability among them,
might be realized more keenly than under the adjudicative model.
B. DOJ or FTC?
The difficult question concerns which agency should be authorized to promulgate
rules under the Sherman Act. Congress’s grant of regulatory authority to the FTC
—an independent agency with both adjudicative power and rulemaking authority
—reflects Congress’s recognition that protecting consumer welfare requires

121. See Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, supra note 27; Hearings on
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, supra note 22.
122. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1268.
123. But see Crane, Technocracy, supra note 20, at 1190 (describing the potential
advantages the adjudicatory model might have over an administrative model).
124. Id.
125. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 98.
126. See infra text accompanying note 192.
127. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1263.
128. See Crane, Technocracy, supra note 20, at 1193 (“Adjudication’s ‘all-or-nothing’
structure is ill suited for antitrust . . . . [A]ntitrust is about solving modern industrialorganization problems, not about expressing social values or similar democratic functions.”).
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specialized decision-making.129 Plus, a series of hearings held by the FTC in the fall
of 2018 and an expressed willingness to utilize its rulemaking capabilities reflects
the sense that clearer and more effective rules are in order.130
One issue with the agency solution is that the FTC’s Bureau of Competition
awkwardly shares regulatory jurisdiction with the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, but only
the DOJ is authorized to enforce the Sherman Act’s criminal provisions. In some
ways, this adds to the difficultly faced by firms in predicting what kind of regulatory
attention their conduct might invite. Not only are parties required to speculate as to
whether their conduct will be subject to per se or rule of reason analysis, they also
must speculate whether their cases will be heard by an Article III court or an
administrative law judge. Still, the antitrust agencies have investigative abilities and
subject matter expertise that the Court does not.131
Though the mechanics of the agency solution are beyond the scope of this Note,
shifting the authority to interpret the Sherman Act to the FTC or DOJ could facilitate
the adoption of clearer, more predictable rules.132 Indeed, the judiciary’s reliance on
amicus briefs in Sherman Act cases and the DOJ’s use of nonbinding guidance
documents may resemble agency decision-making enough that formalizing Sherman
Act notice-and-comment rulemaking makes the most sense.133 But apart from the
mechanical issues of the agency solution, there might also be some constitutional
obstacles. Part III considers whether the vagueness of the Sherman Act’s language
raises separation of powers and fairness concerns such that, absent a significant
legislative update to the Act’s language, the agency solution is a moot point.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE AGENCY SOLUTION
To be sure, the Sherman Act’s sparse text and accompanying body of doctrine are
not viewed across the board as problematic—at least not constitutionally
problematic.134 The prevailing view is that the Court’s interpretive leeway is farreaching, but constitutionally permitted.135 Nonetheless, the Act has been called an
impermissibly broad delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutionally vague
statute.136 While it has not been successfully challenged on these grounds since its
enactment,137 the Act may now be more vulnerable to separation of powers and

129. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 302, at 13–15.
130. Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, supra note
22.
131. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 104; Haw, supra note 9, at 1287.
132. See Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, supra note 27 (arguing that
“‘[r]ulemaking’ often evokes the idea of government imposing some inflexible prescription
upon the marketplace” but that “rulemaking would enable the Commission to issue clear rules
to give market participants sufficient notice about what the law is and is not, helping ensure
that enforcement is predictable”).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 11, at 320–22.
137. Id.
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vagueness attacks in light of its expanded coverage and the contemporary challenges
of regulating competition.138
A. Impermissible Vagueness
The appropriateness of the Act’s criminal penalties is not free from scrutiny,
although the utility of its criminal penalties is plain enough.139 Imprisonment of
individual corporate officials surely deters reprehensible conduct in a way that
issuing an injunction or dipping into a corporation’s treasuries does not.140 Yet, on
its face, the Act’s language does not purport to preclude the possibility that a
defendant may be imprisoned after an ex post finding by a jury that his conduct was
economically unreasonable—regardless of whether it was morally reprehensible.141
If actualized, such a possibility might chill commercial conduct that would be
economically beneficial to society and undeserving of the pain and stigma of criminal
punishment.142 Moreover, laws like the Sherman Act that do not clearly define their
prohibitions may, in practical effect, impermissibly delegate fundamental policy
questions to adjudicators for ad hoc resolution.143
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that criminal statutes be “sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render
them liable to its penalties.”144 Generally speaking, a statute is unconstitutionally
vague if “[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.”145 But the Court does not apply the vagueness
doctrine simplistically, and certain considerations may alleviate concerns over an
otherwise vague statute.146 For example, if the general class of conduct to which a
statute is directed falls plainly within the statute’s terms, the Court likely will not
strike the statute just because marginal cases may raise doubts.147

138. Athanasoulis, supra note 29, at 1289.
139. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 303, at 43 (“A basic policy dispute
about antitrust law concerns the appropriateness of criminal sanctions. The prohibitions of the
Sherman Act are, after all, quite vague and general.”); Connolly, supra note 43.
140. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 303, at 44; see also United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440–41 (1978) (“[T]he behavior proscribed by the Act is often
difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable
business conduct.”).
141. See Connolly, supra note 43.
142. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
67 (1960). Violation of the Sherman Act was punishable as a misdemeanor until it became a
felony in 2004. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
143. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET
& PAMELA S. KARLAN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 119 (5th ed. 2016) (quoting Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972)).
144. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
145. Id.; see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“The underlying
principle is that no [person] shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could
not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”).
146. Anasthoulis, supra note 29, at 1289 n.29.
147. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 618.

1240

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94:1223

Unlike other criminal statutes, though, the Sherman Act requires an unusual level
of interpretation.148 This was made especially evident during the decades
immediately following the Act’s passage, when the Court began to guess at the
meaning of its prohibitions.149 As discussed in Section I.A, the Court declared that
the Act’s language does not mean what it actually says: the Court interpreted “every”
restraint of trade to mean only “unreasonable” restraints of trade.150 Still, to be sure,
the judiciary is generally free to shape the character of criminal prohibitions by
interpreting statutes against varying factual circumstances.151 The judiciary is not,
however, permitted to create common law crimes,152 even if the harm caused by
certain conduct warrants criminal sanctions in the overwhelming majority of cases.
Consider an argument the DOJ once made before the Seventh Circuit: “Since the
per se rules define types of restraints that are illegal without further inquiry into their
competitive reasonableness . . . . It is as if the Sherman Act read: ‘An agreement
among competitors to rig bids is illegal.’”153 But, in fact, the statute does not read
that way. The Sherman Act could include the words “bid-rigging” or “price-fixing”
or “no-poach,” but it does not. It says nothing about limiting criminal penalties to a
single judicially created category of conduct.154 It says nothing about criminal intent
or categorical unreasonabless.155 Such interpretations have instead been worked out
by the Court and by litigants—case-by-case, claim-by-claim.
The nature of modern-day commerce and the lack of any substantive legislative
updates call into question whether the Act still—if it ever did—sufficiently informs
potential defendants of the conduct that could subject them to criminal
punishment.156 Perhaps the Court’s addition of a mens rea element and its distinction
between per se and rule of reason have compensated for any lack of fair notice.157
Indeed, no void-for-vagueness challenge against the Sherman Act has ever
succeeded.158 Yet, the Act’s coverage of unreasonable restraints of trade has greatly
expanded.159 No-poaching agreements, for example, were not always considered an
inherently unreasonable restraint of trade; once they were considered as such, nopoaching agreements were enforced by civil remedies until the 2016 guidance

148. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 303. at 40; see also Haw, supra note 9.
149. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62–65 (1911).
150. Id.
151. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 303, at 45–46.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
153. United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maint. Co., 598 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1979)
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
154. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
155. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the
elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal
crimes . . . .”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity.”).
156. See Connolly, supra note 43.
157. But see Charles D. Weller, The End of Criminal Antitrust’s Per Se Conclusive
Presumptions, 58 ANTITRUST BULL. 665, 668–70 (2013) (arguing that inserting a mens rea
element and limiting antitrust crimes to per se violations may not have fixed the Sherman
Act’s constitutional defects).
158. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
159. Anasthoulis, supra note 29, at 1286; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5,
¶ 303, at 45–46; Price Fixing, Bid Rigging and Market Allocation Schemes, supra note 36.
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document declared that they warranted criminal sanctions.160 Whether a non-binding
guidance document constitutes sufficient notice that no-poach agreements are a
crime is highly debatable. But interpretative developments like the no-poach
guidance have arguably fashioned unlegislated crimes, signaling that the Act may
not provide fair notice.161
B. Controversiality of Administrative Crimes
Another issue implicated by the Sherman Act’s criminal arm is that delegating
interpretive authority to an antitrust agency may undermine basic philosophies of
criminal liability.162 Criminal punishment reflects society’s contempt for certain
conduct, but when a governmental body other than Congress is authorized to
promulgate and enforce criminally punishable prohibitions, society’s voice is not
heard as loudly.163 The Sherman Act was written with such generality that delegation
to an antitrust agency without meaningfully updated language may do little more
than authorize the agency to create controversial administrative crimes.164
The Court has hesitated at times over the degree of deference it should afford to
administrative crimes.165 In Fahey v. Mallonee, for example, the Court postulated
that delegation of rulemaking authority “might not be allowable to authorize creation
of new crimes.”166 The Court later signaled in Touby v. United States that “greater
congressional specificity [may be] required in the criminal context,” but that
precedent is unclear on this question.167 The Court’s hesitancy reflects concerns that

160. NO-POACH GUIDANCE, supra note 15.
161. But see supra Section I.B. The question of whether certain conduct is “inherently”
anticompetitive is not always intuitive. Id.
162. Sanford N. Greenburg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
17 (1996) (“Judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulatory statutes
allegedly undermines the principle that federal crimes must be legislative creations.”). See also
Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don’t Call for Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1849,
1865 (2011) (contending that the rise of the administrative state has created an overabundance
of criminally enforceable administrative regulations).
163. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity.”); see also Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law,
23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958). When a governmental body other than Congress
is authorized to promulgate criminally enforceable rules, there is potential for arbitrary
deprivations of liberty. Id.; see also Mark D. Alexander, Note, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for
the Administrative Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 612, 614 (1992).
164. Greenburg, supra note 162, at 17. (“Judicial deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous regulatory statutes allegedly undermines the principle that federal crimes must be
legislative creations.”).
165. As with congressional delegations generally, the Court has become more accepting of
administrative crimes as time has passed. Compare United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677
(1892), with United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
166. 332 U.S. 245, 252 (1947).
167. 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991). At issue in Touby was a provision of the Controlled
Substances Act, which authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to deem manufacture, possession,
or distribution of particular substances illegal if he or she decides the substance presents an
“imminent hazard to the public safety.” Id. at 163. Petitioners claimed delegations permitting
the Attorney General to define—rather than simply enforce—the criminally punishable
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the power to define crimes—that is, to codify the moral judgements of society—
should belong to Congress, rather than administrative agencies.168 While agency
administrators are often the top experts in their substantive fields, they are probably
not the appropriate arbiters of society’s moral persuasion.169
Since Touby, the Court has not reconsidered the intelligible principle standard’s
low barrier in the context of agencies interpreting vague criminal statutes. But the
possibility remains open.170 At least three of the sitting Justices have since questioned
the propriety of administrative crimes, as well as the efficacy of the nondelegation
doctrine.171 Despite no official condemnation of administrative crimes, the future
possibility thereof could stymie a delegation of rulemaking authority to an antitrust
agency.
C. Unguided Agency Authorizations
Notwithstanding the Sherman Act’s dual criminal-civil character, it has long been
recognized as a general principle that Congress cannot shift its legislative power to
other branches of the federal government.172 This principle, referred to as the

conduct should be guided by something more than an intelligible principle. Id. at 165–66. The
Court declined to answer this claim in detail because the delegation would “[pass] muster even
if greater congressional specificity [were] required in the criminal context.” Id.
168. Greenburg, supra note 162, at 17.
169. See Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory
Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1121
(1988) (“[T]here are no real values experts.”); Myers, supra note 162, at 1864.
170. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gundy v. United States, No-17-6086 (argued
Oct. 2, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/17-6086-petition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3B72-7H5Q]. As of the writing of this Note, the disposition of Gundy
remains to be seen. Id. A major question in the case is whether the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act impermissibly delegates authority to the Attorney General in violation of
the nondelegation doctrine. Id. Petitioner Gundy argued that SORNA is unconstitutional in
part because “[t]he Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers,
particularly in the criminal context.” Brief for Petitioner at 17, Gundy v. United States, No17-6086 (argued Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17
-6086/48309/20180525141125861_Brief%20for%20Petitioner.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QTT
-SXGG]. According to Petitioner Gundy, “Congress has delegated to the Attorney General the
authority to define, and determine the scope of, the elements of SORNA’s new federal criminal
offense,” which are “quintessentially legislative powers.” Id. at 23. For a general summary of
the case, see Mila Sohoni, Argument Preview: Justices Face Nondelegation Challenge to
Federal Sex-Offender Registration Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 25, 2018, 10:11 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2018/09/argument-preview-justices-face-nondelegation-challenge-to
-federal-sex-offender-registration-law [https://perma.cc/5A6H-2Z4F].
171. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018) (Gorsuch J., concurring);
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v.
Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
172. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 692 (1892); A.J. Kritikos, Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A Compromise
and an Experiment, 82 MO. L. REV. 441, 442 (2017); see also, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (recognizing that “legislation must often be adapted to
complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal
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nondelegation doctrine, is integral to the preservation of our tripartite system of
government.173 Yet, despite its importance, determining how and when to apply the
nondelegation doctrine is not an easy task.174 The Court struggled early on to draw a
workable line between permissible and impermissible delegations.175 Even after
declaring it universally recognized that Congress cannot delegate legislative power,
the Court eventually acquiesced to this line-drawing difficulty after the Great
Depression.176
The “intelligible principle” standard, by which the Court has traditionally
determined whether a delegation offends the separation of powers, is extremely
deferential to Congress’s need for regulatory assistance.177 Under this standard, a
congressional delegation will be constitutionally agreeable so long as the enabling
legislation contains an explicit and intelligible principle to guide the agency as it
exercises the regulatory authority conferred upon it.178 Intelligible principles need
not be articulated with any serious specificity. For instance, Congress authorized the
Securities and Exchange Commission to ensure holding companies’ corporate
structures do not “unduly or unnecessarily complicate” or “unfairly or inequitably
distribute” shareholders’ voting power.179 Similarly, the Federal Communications
Commission was charged with regulating broadcast licensing according to “public
interest, convenience, or necessity.”180 The Court held that the intelligible principle
standard had been satisfied in both instances.181
The text of the Sherman Act may not, to the contrary, contain an ostensible
intelligible principle.182 The Act broadly prohibits conduct “in restraint of trade”
without defining restraint of trade and without mentioning, for example, public

directly”).
173. See Kritikos, supra note 172.
174. Id.
175. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the doctrine of
unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts.”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
1, 42–43 (1825) (explaining that deciding the boundary at which to demarcate the permissible
from the impermissible requires a delicate inquiry with no clear-cut answers). But see Gary
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 395 (2002) (positing that it
is no more difficult to draw a line between execution and lawmaking than it is to draw a line
between reasonable and unreasonable searches and seizures).
176. See, e.g., Field, 143 U.S. at 692 (1892); see also Kritikos, supra note 172, at 442.
Only twice since then has the Court held a delegation unconstitutional. See Whitman, 531 U.S.
at 474–75. The court found an unconstitutional delegation in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935), and another in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
177. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943). Perhaps insignificantly, the Court later
added that Congress must also delineate the outer boundaries of the delegated authority. See
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
178. See J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406.
179. Am. Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 104.
180. NBC, 319 U.S. at 225–26.
181. Am. Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 104; NBC, 319 U.S. at 225–26.
182. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
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interest,183 protection of small businesses, or any other guiding principle.184 The
Act’s few words say nothing about how to determine whether trade has in fact been
restrained or when a would-be restraint of trade should be overlooked because of the
benefits it confers.185 Some would argue that the measuring stick should be whether
conduct affects the democratic process;186 others would argue the size and structure
of firms is the better guidepost.187 But because the Act says nothing to that effect, the
doctrine has come to represent the Court’s struggle to “settle on an intelligible
principle of [its] own choosing.”188
During the latter half of the twentieth century the Court settled on the principle
articulated by Robert Bork, commonly considered the most influential scholar of
modern antitrust theory.189 Bork maintained that in framing the Sherman Act broadly,
Congress left the courts free to frame subsidiary rules so long as such rules are geared
toward the advancement of consumer welfare.190 The ultimate goal of the Sherman
Act, said Bork, should be to “improve allocative efficiency without impairing
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer
welfare.”191 That is, Sherman Act regulation should be executed in a way that ensures
societal resources are both produced effectively by firms and expended on tasks
consumers value most.192
It may be that such a goal, which has guided antitrust jurisprudence since the late
1970s,193 provides an intelligible principle suitable to guide Sherman Act
interpreters.194 The problem is that Congress did not reference the consumer welfare

183. Id.
184. Id.; see also 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 111, at
103 100 (4th. ed. 2014).
185. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
186. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 162 (2013); Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy
Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2013).
187. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 27, at 717 (using the “lens of market structure to reveal
anticompetitive aspects of Amazon’s strategy and conduct”).
188. Oldham, supra note 11, at 352 (observing that it is “unclear how or why the courts
can function as antitrust lawmakers without any statutorily designated principle . . . to guide
their discretion”). But see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 184, at 100 (“[T]he judges are
not totally at large. Statutory language sets some bounds . . . . And although the [Act’s] words
may be somewhat elastic in meaning, they are not entirely protean.”) (emphasis added).
189. See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, ‘Antitrust Was Defined by Robert Bork. I Cannot Overstate
His Influence.,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/2012/12/20/antitrust-was-defined-by-robert-bork-i-cannot-overstate-his-influence
/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2fd5037d7a9e [https://perma.cc/C4U4-SDPC].
190. BORK, supra note 8, at 61; Oldham, supra note 11, at 345; Daniel Fisher, Robert Bork,
The Man Who Redefined Antitrust, Is Dead At 85, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2012, 11:44 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/12/19/robert-bork-the-man-who-redefined
-antitrust-is-dead-at-85/#2c95e1ddcad9 [https://perma.cc/SWT5-EUSE] (“Bork explained
how antitrust law only makes sense when viewed as a regulatory structure designed to protect
consumers from monopolists.”).
191. BORK, supra note 8, at 91.
192. Id.
193. Khan, supra note 27, at 716.
194. But see Khan, supra note 27, at 737–38 (“[T]he consumer welfare approach to
antitrust is unduly narrow and betrays congressional intent, as evident from legislative history
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standard in the Act. And there was no consensus on the Court before 1979 that it
should be singularly guided by the goal of maximizing consumer welfare.195 Of
course, Congress could insert a consumer welfare provision into the Sherman Act.
The likelihood of this, however, is low—especially in light of energized calls for a
reformulated standard that measures welfare more holistically.196 Either way, the
Sherman Act’s language does not explicitly state a guiding standard at all. Without
such, a delegation of interpretive authority to an antitrust agency may run afoul of
the nondelegation doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The Sherman Act, by its vague and sweeping language, is a broad delegation of
authority to the Supreme Court. Congress sent us into the wilderness—law students
and generalist judges alike. In light of swelling desire for the antitrust laws to be
more effective against modern-day competition foes, Congress should update the
Sherman Act. The common-law approach has not achieved the stability one would
expect of a statute levying hefty criminal sanctions, and the Court appears to
approximate agency rulemaking on an increasingly frequent basis. Delegating
rulemaking authority to an antitrust agency may be a viable solution. But there are
some draw backs—namely constitutional objections to which the Sherman Act may
be vulnerable, especially if an agency delegation were not accompanied by some
level of additional statutory clarity. Even if the agency solution proves unworkable,
Congress should address head-on the growing need for clarity, predictability, and
stability, which the Sherman Act significantly fails to provide.

and as documented by a vast body of scholarship.”).
195. See Khan, supra note 27, at 718. The “market-structure based understanding of
competition” was foundational through the 1960s. Id. Congress was likely concerned more
with suppliers’ welfare than consumers’ when it enacted the Sherman Act. See, e.g., AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 184, ¶ 101, at 9–11 (“Although the drafters of the Sherman Act
were concerned about injury to consumers, they were significantly more concerned about
various kinds of injury to competitors.”); Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the
Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-Examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON.
HIST. 359, 359 (1993).
196. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 27.

